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I. BACKGROUND 
Natural gas markets are in focus nowadays due to different events and market trends. The 
most important are the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the pressure on the Russian suppliers due 
to increase of global gas supply and the continuous regulatory intentions to facilitate the 
evolution of the more competitive and efficient natural gas wholesale markets.  
In 2015 about 70 percent of European gas consumption was covered by import and this 
import dependency is expected to increase in the following years due to the continuous 
decrease of European inland production. Since the European gas import is mostly delivered 
by Russia, which is furthermore the only supplier in some of the member states, the 
conditions of long-term gas contracts between European countries and Russia and the Russian 
strategic behaviour are very important.  
One possible way to quantitatively analyse natural gas markets is market modelling which 
synthetizes industrial organization models with a detailed database representing the real 
market circumstances. 
This dissertation summarizes some of my analysis work which was carried out using gas 
market modelling. All analysed topics are in connection with market distortions due to 
Russian long-term contracts and the strategic behaviour of Russian supplier which have 
significant impact on the wholesale gas prices and consumers’ welfare. During the analysis 
we endeavoured to examine practical problems and to find results which can support policy 
decisions.  
The structure of my dissertation is the following. First the most important characteristics of 
European gas markets will be introduced mainly aiming to confirm the relevancy and 
actuality of the analysed problems. Then after a short summary of gas market models, the 
European Gas Market Model – the modelling tool used for the analysis is introduced. The 
main part of the dissertation contains three detailed analysis which investigate the most 
important factors of the consumers’ welfare on the European gas markets.  
 
II. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EUROPEAN GAS MARKETS 
However a slight convergence can be observed, there are still significant differences among 
the wholesale gas prices of different regions in Europe. In the Balkan region for example gas 
2 
 
prices are higher by 30 percent than the Western European spot prices (DG ENERGY 
(2015)). 
Higher prices arise typically in those countries where there is a weak competition on the 
wholesale market and among suppliers. Only a few suppliers compete for the European 
markets: pipeline gas is delivered by Russian, Algeria and Norway while LNG is mainly 
delivered by Qatar, Algeria, Nigeria and the Middle East. According to the Monitoring Report 
of ACER 75 percent of the gas supply derives from one supplier (mostly Russia) in 10 
member states. This dominant supplier has a significant market share and market power in 
more European countries. This implies that the conditions of Russian long-term contracts 
have an outstanding importance. Market distortions derive from these contracts and the 
possible regulatory solutions to eliminate them are analysed in the first analysis of my 
dissertation.   
Week interconnection between certain European countries can also prevent from the 
development of effective competition. In the second analysis, the most important missing 
infrastructure in the European gas system will be identified assuming different market 
structures and demand scenarios.  
In the recent past Asian gas prices have declined due the demand decrease and increase of 
global gas supply. The main reasons of the demand decrease are the cheap coal, the spread of 
renewable energy sources, the restart of nuclear power plants in Japan, and the low oil prices. 
These developments have increased the relative attractiveness of Europe for the LNG 
importer countries. The entry of new suppliers (such as USA) to the European gas markets 
have to be taken into consideration by the Russian exporter Gasprom. The third analysis 
included in the dissertation examines the possible entry strategies of US LNG to the European 
markets and the possible strategic response of Russia.      
 
III. RESEARCH METHOD: GAS MARKET MODELLING 
All analysis included in my dissertation was carried out by the European Gas Market Model 
developed by the Regional Centre of Energy Policy Research. In the followings the main 
characteristics of this model will be summarized compared to other models used in academic 
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literature.1 It must be noted that all simulation runs were run and all calculations based on 
modelling results was carried out by the author.      
 
The literature spanning equilibrium models for European natural gas markets is extensive. 
Prominent modeling tools are, for example, GASTALE (Boots et al, (2004), Egging and 
Gabriel (2006)), NATGAS (Mulder and Zwart (2006), Zwart (2009)), TIGER (Lochner and 
Bothe (2007), Lochner (2011), Dieckhöner et al(2013)), GASMOD (Holz et al (2008)), World 
Gas Model (Egging et al (2010)), Global Gas Model (Holz et al (2013), Richter and Holz 
(2015)). Smeers (2008) provides an in depth analysis of the models prior to 2008.  
The EGMM differs from these models in several aspects. The most important advantage it 
has, particularly in this instance, is a detailed representation of long-term take-or-pay 
contracts that allows Russian long-term contracts and European gas prices to interact under 
different scenarios. This also allows for the examination of the effects of virtual reverse flows. 
While most models are based on the strategic behavior of the Cournot-game framework with 
competition amongst market participants, the EGMM assumes that all market participants are 
price takers. Working with perfectly competitive equilibrium has drawbacks, but our 
assumption is that most upstream market power is exercised within the context of long-term 
contracts and the market operates more like the competitive benchmark in the short run. The 
price-taking assumption allows for more detailed geographic and temporal dimensions. While 
modeling literature often merges smaller neighboring markets especially in South Eastern 
Europe, we only aggregate demand at the country level. Demand functions in the model are 
assumed to be price responsive which allows for detailed social welfare analysis. Whereas the 
cited models typically include only 1-3 seasons per year, the EGMM timeframe is broken into 
monthly periods. This monthly division is particularly important for market disruption 
scenarios, which tend to be short-lived, and it also allows for the effect of seasonal storage 
activities to be observed.  
IV.  MAIN RESULTS 
In the followings the main results of the three analysis presented in the dissertation will be 
summarized. 
                                                 
1 Detailed model description can be found in (Kiss et al. (2015)) 
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IV.1. Short-term effects of the Ukrainian crisis on the security of gas supply in 
Central-Eastern Europe and Hungary2 
In Chapter 6 of the dissertation the vulnerability and the short term resilience of the European 
gas market to supply side shocks are modelled. We analyse the effect of some short-term 
regulatory interventions on the wholesale gas price and consumers’ welfare of the most 
vulnerable Central and Eastern European gas markets in the case of a security of supply crisis.  
Two security of supply scenarios are modelled: 
• A short-term security of supply situation is modelled through a one month disruption 
of Russian gas supplies through Ukraine in January. 
• A longer-term crisis is modelled through a six-month disruption on the same route. 
Three short term regulatory measures were analysed that aim to increase the resilience of gas 
markets to supply disruptions in the short run through the better use of existing infrastructure:  
• allowing spot trade on all interconnection points;  
• allowing virtual trade against the physical flow; 
• allowing bidirectional flows on all EU-EU borders.  
In the followings the main effect of this three regulatory measures will be summarized. All 
parts of the analysis were carried out by using European Gas Market Model introduced 
before.  
 
Allowing spot trade on the interconnection points 
 
In this section we analyse the effect of allowing short-term (spot) trade on the gas 
interconnector from Romania to Bulgaria. The capacity of this interconnector is currently 
booked by Gasprom and it is not possible to use these capacities even if they are not fully 
used by long-term Russian gas deliveries. Modelling results are summarized in Figure 1 and 
Table 1.   
 
                                                 
2 This chapter is based on Selei-Tóth (2015a) 
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Figure 1 Price increase due to a one month disruption of Russian deliveries through Ukraine in case of 
allowing spot flows compared to the reference case (€/MWh)  
a) January price increase int he reference b) Allowing spot trade 
 
Note: green boxes show the price increase (in €/MWh) due to a short-term security of supply crisis compared to 
the normal (without crisis situation). Colouring is in line with the seriousness of price increase: darker colour 
means higher price increase. 
 
Source: Selei-Tóth (2015a) – output of gas market model 
 
In line with our expectations due to allowing spot trade on the interconnector between the 
significantly cheaper Romania and the more expensive Bulgaria, the price growth in Romania 
due to a short-term crisis increases by 5.8 €/MWh, while price increase in Bulgaria and 
Macedonia drops by 16.4 €/MWh. 
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Table 1 Price and consumer welfare change due to allowing spot trade compared to the reference case in 
the case of short and long-term security of supply crisisa 
 Wholesale gas prices (€/MWh) Consumer’s welfare (million €) 
January  Six months January  Six months 
Absolute 
price  
Change  Average 
price  
Change  Absolute 
value  
Change Absolute 
value  
Change 
Austria 28.6 0.0 27.3 0.0 340.6 0.0 1696.2 0.0 
Bosnia-
Hercegovina 
42.3 
(37) 
0.1 
49.5 
(46.7) 
0.0 
3.0 
(3.7) 
0.0 
11.8 
(13.5) 
0.0 
Bulgaria 34.0 –16.4 38.6 –20.8 122.7 60.4 454.1 288.7 
Greece 26.8 0.0 25.5 0.0 111.1 0.0 599.4 0.0 
Croatia 27.9 0.0 29.8 0.0 86.5 0.0 444.3 0.0 
Hungary 37.5 
(32.1) 
0.1 
45.4 
(42.0) 
0.0 
309.4 
(374.0) 
–1.0 
988.1 
(11 44.7) 
0.0 
Italy  26.9 0.0 26.9 0.0 3178.2 0.0 14 344.7 0.0 
Macedonia 
37.0 –16.4 
41.4 
(41.1) 
–20.8 3.2 1.7 
16.0 
(16.3) 
10.6 
Moldova 38.5 
(36.6) 
0.1 
48.3 
(47.7) 
0.0 
26.1 
(28.0) 
–0.1 
87.8 
(90.0) 
0.0 
Poland 26.6 0.0 25.9 0.0 658.8 0.0 3 320.2 0.0 
Romania 31.1 5.8 35.6 7.1 316.9 –64.5 1 422.2 –389.5 
Serbia 40.3 
(35.0) 
0.1 
47.6 
(44.7) 
0.0 
63.1 
(77.0) 
–0.2 
263.1 
(300.0) 
0.0 
Slovenia 29.9 0.0 28.3 0.0 29.8 0.0 146.4 0.0 
Slovakia 27.7 0.0 26.7 0.0 271.5 0.0 1 172.1 0.0 
Ukraine 34.6 
(32.8) 
0.1 
44.5 
(43.9) 
0.0 
2 191.5 
(2 337.5) 
–7.0 
6 413.7 
(6 564.9) 
0.0 
Regional 
average/total 
30.3 
(29.5) 
0.1 
33.0 
(32.7) 
0.2 
7 712.4 
(7 939.5) 
–10.7 
31 380.0 
(31 755.0) 
–90.2 
EU-
average/total 
25.5 
(25.4) 
0.0 
25.1 
(25.0) 
0.1 
19 435.6 
(19 500.1) 
–5.1 
90 455.4 
(90 638.1) 
–100.8 
a The values in the brackets show the same values assuming that Hungarian strategic storage stocks are released. 
The analysis of these results are not detailed here. 
 
Source: Selei-Tóth (2015a) – own calculations based on gas market model 
 
Table 1 shows that allowing spot trade has only a local effect: it improves the situation of the 
Bulgarian and Macedonian consumers, while worsen the situation of Romanian consumers. 
As the gas demand in Romania is triple than the sum of gas demand in Bulgaria and 
Macedonia, the overall consumers’ welfare decreases. However this decrease is overbalanced 
by the welfare change of other market participants, mainly the Romanian producers.  
 
The effect of allowing virtual reverse flows 
In the followings we analyse the effects of allowing virtual reverse flows (backhaul) on a 
certain delivery route. To examine this question we assume that Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP, which delivers Azeri gas from Turkey through Greece and Albania to Italy) and two 
connecting interconnectors (Greek-Bulgarian and Bulgarian-Serbian) come online. The results 
are summarized in Figure 2 and Table 2.  
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Figure 2 The effect of allowing virtual reverse flows on the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline in case of normal and 
short-term SOS scenarios 
a) Normal scenario b) Short-term (January) SOS scenario 
 
Note: Green boxes show the wholesale gas prices allowing virtual reverse flow on TAP in €/MWh: a) yearly 
average, b) January prices. Colouring shows the price decrease due to virtual reverse flow. Circled arrows show 
the assumed new infrastructure 
 
Source: Selei-Tóth (2015a) – output of gas market model 
 
  
Table 2 Effect of allowing virtual reverse flows on the wholesale gas prices and consumers’ welfare  
 Wholesale gas prices (€/MWh) Consumer’s welfare (million €) 
in normal 
scenario 
in short-term 
SOS scenario 
in long-term SOS 
scenario 
in normal 
scenario 
in short-term 
SOS scenario 
in long-term SOS 
scenario 
Austria 0.1 –0.2 0.2 –5.6 1.8 –9.5 
Bosnia-
Hercegovina 
–2.1 –1.5 0.0 3.4 0.2 0.0 
Bulgaria –2.4 –0.6 –0.7 90.6 2.9 13.9 
Greece –2.2 –0.6 –0.8 78.0 2.2 14.1 
Croatia 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.8 0.0 –0.7 
Hungary –0.1 0.0 –0.1 6.1 0.5 6.4 
Italy  0.2 0.2 0.2 –86.5 –18.0 –86.1 
Macedonia –2.2 –0.6 –0.8 3.5 0.1 0.6 
Moldova 0.0 0.0 –0.5 0.5 0.0 2.1 
Poland 0.0 –0.1 0.1 –4.9 2.0 –9.9 
Romania 0.0 –0.1 –1.1 3.0 1.5 65.0 
Serbia –2.1 –1.5 0.0 66.2 4.5 0.0 
Slovenia 0.1 –0.2 0.2 –0.4 0.2 –0.8 
Slovakia 0.0 –0.2 0.1 –0.9 1.4 –4.6 
Ukraine 0.0 0.0 –0.5 28.2 3.4 140.2 
Regional 
average/total 
–0.2 0.0 –0.1 180.2 2.7 130.6 
EU-
average/total 
0.0 –0.1 0.0 –12.6 36.2 –91.9 
 
Source: Selei-Tóth (2015a) – own calculations based on gas market model 
 
It can be seen that in case of normal scenario in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia and Bosnia 
Hercegovina prices decrease by more than 2 €/MWh due to allowing virtual reverse flows. 
However in Italy a slight price increase arises, as less Azeri gas reach Italian market. 
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Concerning consumer welfare it is worth noting that the previous countries can realize most 
of the consumer welfare growth already in the normal scenario, in the SOS scenarios this 
effect is less important.  
 
 
The effect of allowing reverse flow on existing pipelines on the regional security of 
supply  
In the followings we analyse the situation when regulation obligates to allowing reverse flow 
on all existing pipelines of EU-EU borders up to total capacity.  
Figure 3 shows the market integration effect of allowing reverse flows: while in the analyzed 
region the price growth due to a security of supply crisis decreases, price growth in Western 
European countries slightly increase.  
Figure 3 Price increase due to a January SOS crises in the reference scenario and allowing reverse flows 
(€/MWh)  
a) Reference b) Allowing reverse flows 
 
Note: green boxes show the price increase (in €/MWh) due to a short-term security of supply crisis compared to 
the normal (without crisis situation). Colouring is in line with the seriousness of price increase: darker colour 
means higher price increase. 
 
Source: Selei-Tóth (2015a) – output of gas market model 
 
Table 3 summarizes the effect on wholesale gas prices and consumers’ welfare. 
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Table 3 Change of wholesale prices and consumers’ welfare due to allowing reverse flows in case of short-
and long-term SOS scenarios 
 Wholesale gas prices (€/MWh) Consumer’s welfare (million €) 
January  Six months January  Six months 
Absolute 
price  
Change  Absolute 
price  
Change  Absolute 
value  
Change Absolute 
value  
Change 
Austria 27.1 
(27.0) 
–1.5 25.9 –1.4 357.1 16.6 1 771.0 74.8 
Bosnia-
Hercegovina 
39.6 
(36.1) 
–2.6 
46.0 
(45.1) 
–3.6 
3.4  
(3.8) 
0.3 
14.0  
(14.5) 
2.2 
Bulgaria 28.6 –21.6 28.8 –30.6 146.4 84.1 639.7 474.3 
Greece 27.3 0.5 27.2 1.7 109.4 –1.7 568.9 –30.6 
Croatia 30.5 
(27.0) 
2.7 
37.0  
(36.1) 
7.2 
79.4  
(88.8) 
–7.1 
346.6  
(358.4) 
–97.7 
Hungary 34.7 
(31.2) 
–2.6 
41.3 
(40.3) 
–4.1 
341.7  
(3 85.4) 
31.2 
1 178.0 
(1 222.4) 
189.8 
Italy  26.9 0.0 26.6 –0.3 3 178.2 0.0 14 499.7 155.0 
Macedonia 31.8 
(31.7) 
–21.6 31.7 –30.6 3.9 2.3 23.0 17.6 
Moldova 37.5 
(36.4) 
–0.9 
47.1 
(46.1) 
–1.2 
27.1  
(28.3) 
0.9 
92.8  
(96.9) 
5.0 
Poland 26.9 0.4 25.7 –0.2 650.6 –8.2 3 336.7 16.6 
Romania 27.8 
(24.8) 
2.5 
33.8 
(33.0) 
5.3 
353.1  
(387.6) 
–28.2 
1514.3  
(15 56.8) 
–297.5 
Serbia 37.6  
(34.1) 
–2.6 
44.0  
(43.1) 
–3.6 
70.0  
(79.5) 
6.7 
309.9  
(321.9) 
46.8 
Slovenia 28.4  
(28.2) 
–1.5 27.2 –1.1 31.3 1.5 151.8 5.4 
Slovakia 27.5 –0.2 26.2 0.0 273.0 1.5 1 173.5 1.5 
Ukraine 33.6  
(32.5) 
–0.9 
43.3 
(42.3) 
–1.2 
2 269.6 
(2 359.3) 
71.1 
6 749.8 
(7 023.0) 
336.0 
Regional 
average/total 
29.2  
(28.5) 
–1.0 
32.2 
(31.9) 
–0.6 
7 894.1 
(80 88.0) 
170.9 
32 369.5 
(32 758.1) 
899.3 
EU-
average/total 
25.9  
(25.7) 
0.5 25.2 0.2 
19 180.5  
(19 317.4) 
–60.3 
90 202.7  
(90 301.5) 
–353.6 
a The values in the brackets show the same values assuming that Hungarian strategic storage stocks are released. 
The analysis of these results are not detailed here. 
 
Source: Selei-Tóth (2015a) – own calculations based on gas market model 
 
It can be seen that Bulgaria and Macedonia realize the highest benefits due to the 
interconnection with Greece. Significant benefits also arise in Hungary, Serbia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina due to Hungary’s interconnection with Romania and Croatia. However prices 
increase in Greece, Romania and Croatia, the overall effect on the regional consumer welfare 
is positive. 
Looking at the utilization of these reverse flow capacities it can be seen that the most 
important ones are the German-Austrian, Romanian-Hungarian, Croatian-Hungarian and 
Greek-Bulgarian interconnectors.  
 
During the analysis we overall found that the first two regulatory measures (allowing spot 
trade and virtual reverse flows) have rather local effect on the markets, but bidirectional 
physical flows increase the security of supply of the whole region - mostly because of better 
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connecting Central and Eastern Europe to the Western gas markets. Modelling the three 
measures together we found that Hungarian consumers realize significant part of the 
monetized benefits that we measure; hence Hungary has a profound interest in supporting the 
European gas market integration. In the analysis we also found that the Hungarian strategic 
storage is a useful tool to mitigate the damages of a potential crisis not only within the 
Hungarian borders but also on a regional basis. 
IV.2. A top-down approach to identify the most important natural gas cross-
border infrastructure projects3 
This chapter identifies the most important missing natural gas interconnections under varying 
market circumstances based on gas market modelling. Apart from analyzing the current 
market structure we also carry out the examination in an innovative way: we change the 
delivery points of Russian gas supply contracts to the borders of the EU, excluding Ukraine 
which is in line with the will of Russia.  
As whole version of this paper is written in English (Selei-Tóth (2015b)) and attached to my 
documentation, here I only summarize the main conclusions: 
1. Beyond the expansion of existing infrastructures (Austria to Hungary in 2015; 
Germany to Austria in 2020), the identified infrastructures to be implemented (with 
predefined routes for long term contracts) are the full reverse flow on the Romanian-
Hungarian, the Romanian-Moldavian 1,5 bcm/yr pipeline, the 5 bcm/yr interconnector 
between Greece and Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian – Serbian 3 bcm /yr interconnector 
and by 2020 also the Bulgarian-Romanian interconnector. 
2. Modelling runs for 2015 show that with current destination restrictions in long term 
contracts additional interconnections between markets will create losses on European 
level. In the 2020 scenario, however, mainly due to the phasing out of long term 
contracts, the social welfare impact of new infrastructure becomes significantly higher 
and positive in the EU28. The policy implication is that by 2020 there will be 
substantially less incentive for market participants to delay the identified projects.  
3. Beyond assumptions in the present structure and route of Russian long term contracts 
in the 2020 setup, key natural gas infrastructure was also identified more innovatively: 
Russian gas was delivered exclusively to EU borders outside of Ukraine at the same 
                                                 
3 This chapter is based on the working paper Selei-Tóth (2015b) which was submitted to The Energy Journal and 
currently is under review.   
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price (23 €/MWh) for all buyers, leaving market forces to handle the internal 
distribution of the gas between countries. For this scenario the pre-requisite is that two 
strings of the Turkish Steam are built (30 bcm/yr), the Turkey- Greece interconnector 
is extended, and reverse flow on Trans-Balkan is allowed between Turkey and 
Bulgaria. In this scenario on top of the defined key projects of point 1 the Polish-
Slovakian interconnector assumes a significant role in delivering Russian gas from 
Yamal to CSEE.  
4. Only the structural change in Russian delivery points at EU borders (without any PCI 
project built) would bring benefits to the region of a similar magnitude as building all 
of the infrastructures identified for 2020 integration, however the position of the 
market participants shifts substantially. LTC holders would benefit considerably by 
eliminating contract routes, but the total welfare change for most of the CSEE regions 
(except for Bulgaria) would be negative.  
5. Modelling LTC delivery point changed to EU borders together with the PCI projects 
of point 1 plus Polish-Slovakian interconnector positive welfare change results triple: 
besides LTC contract holders, also consumers and TSOs would become beneficiaries 
of the structural change. Thus the Russian President might inadvertently encourage a 
more competitive and efficient European gas market by freeing up delivery points in 
the existing contracts. 
6. Finally, the demand scenario analysis that quantifies gas consumption savings due to 
energy efficiency and RES development shows that average European-wide wholesale 
gas prices would decrease an average of of 2.3 €/MWh. These measures also solidify 
the utilization of the identified key pipeline infrastructure. 
 
IV.3. Modelling of market strategies in connection with the entry of US LNG to 
the European market 
Although a few years ago US LNG deliveries into Europe seemed to be a utopia in the latest 
months it has started to materialize as the first contracts were signed with a delivery in 2018. 
The showing up of US gas in the European markets is due to two main factors. First, the non-
conventional gas production revolution in the US pushed down the prices on the US market 
and increased the global gas supply, and the decrease of Asian gas prices (due to the 
previously mentioned reasons) has also increased the relative attractiveness of the European 
prices. 
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The arrival of US deliveries into Europe is expected to strengthen Europe’s position against 
Russia. Therefore Russia will probably make strategic response keep its current market 
position. 
This chapter of my thesis analysis the optimal entry strategy of US and the possible strategic 
responses of Russia in a simple game theoretic framework.  
IV.4. Possible strategies of Russia 
In my thesis it is shown that Russia has a favourable position to be able to protect its current 
market share in the European market. Its production cost structure makes it to be able to give 
significant price discounts. Based on Henderson et. al. (2014) we assume that Russian gas can 
be sold at a price of 4.5 $/MMBtu in Western Europe.  
We analyse three possible strategies of Russia:  
• Focus on market share (SPOT):  selling low-priced spot gas on the European market 
•  Achieving higher prices in Europe (ACQ): Russia can try to preserve its price-
setting role by reducing TOP quantities and limit spot sales 
• Price discount of contracted deliveries (PRICE): Russia tries to increase its sales by 
give price discounts in the case of long-term contracts differentiating between markets 
In our sequential market game first the US traders decide whether they enter into European 
market or not. If they decide to enter, they can choose from three different prices: 
• They are selling at a minimum price of 7.4 $/MMBtu on average in Europe. This case 
is in line with our modelling reference scenario. 
• They are selling at a minimum price of 6.5 $/MMBtu on average. Based on market 
information this is “good enough” price for the American traders.  
• They are selling at a minimum price of 5 $/MMBtu on average, which is estimated to 
be enough to cover the marginal cost of US gas’s delivery into Europe. 
All of these prices are the minimum prices at which Americans are willing to sell on 
average; however the actual selling prices are depends on the equilibrium market prices of 
LNG importer countries.    
After observing the decision of American traders, Russia selects its best response from the 
abovementioned possible actions. 
In the case of all outcomes the profits of American and Russian parties were calculated 
based on the market modelling results. Based on (Henderson et.al., 2014) we assumed that 
the marginal cost of Russia to deliver their gas to Western Europe is 4.5 $/MMBtu. 
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Assuming that the players maximize these profits we are looking for the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium. Payoffs (profits) of the market players and their optimal decisions are 
depicted in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 Payoffs of the different market players and optimal decisions 
  
 
Source: own figure based on own calculations 
 
In the subgame perfect equilibrium the optimal strategy for the American traders is to enter 
the European market at a minimum price of 6.5 $/MMBtu. The best response from Russia is 
to selling low-priced spot gas on the European market when US LNG enters at low (5 
$/MMBtu) or high (7.4 $/MMBtu) price, and not to response when US LNG enters at middle 
price.  
Based on the modelling results and the solution of the game described before the following 
main conclusions can be drawn: 
• Assuming that US LNG enters at 7.4 $/MMBtu price RU would react by selling more 
gas on spot market or auctions. By that some (Western) European countries would 
reduce their Russian LTC offtake to the minimum level, and buy RU spot gas instead 
of US LNG. RU would earn a bit more on the auctions than what it would loose on 
reduced LTC offtakes.  
These results are in line with the fact that Gazprom started first spot auctions just 
recently, in September 7-10, 2015, and plans to hold its next gas auction by the end 
of 2015.  
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• For Russia selling on the spot market is always a better strategy than to give price 
discount on LTCs or reducing ACQ levels. 
• However Russia would not respond to US LNG entering to Europe at a US selling 
price of around 6.5 $/MMBtu. In this case income on spot sales would not compensate 
for losses on LTC offtakes. 
• At the 5 $/MMBtu US price the offtake of Russian LTCs is anyway on the minimum 
level. This is why spot sales are increasing the RU profit. 
It is worth noting that during the analysis we assumed that the main objective of Russia is the 
profit maximization. However other strategic objectives are also possible, for example 
deterring US from entry.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
As the gas import dependency of Europe is expected to grow in the near future, the 
competition between the main importers, and strategic behaviour of Russia has a significant 
impact on the wholesale gas prices and consumers’ welfare. Investment into missing 
infrastructure also has an outstanding importance. In this dissertation summarize three 
analysis which examine these questions using gas market modelling.  
In Chapter 6 of the we analyse the effect of some short-term regulatory interventions on the 
wholesale gas price and consumers’ welfare of the most vulnerable Central and Eastern 
European gas markets in the case of a security of supply crisis. While those interventions 
which concern only one interconnector have typically local positive effect, allowing 
bidirectional flows significantly improve the security of supply situation in CEE due to better 
interconnection with Western markets. 
The aim of Chapter 7 of the dissertation was to identify those missing infrastructure elements 
which are necessary for the European gas market integration. We also calculated the welfare 
effects of these interconnectors and compared to the investment costs. We find that a small 
number of projects are sufficient to maximize the net gain in regional welfare, but different 
scenarios favour different project combinations.  
Chapter 8 of the dissertation analyses the effect of supply increase in the global gas market: 
potential entry strategies of US LNG and the possible strategic response of Gazprom. The 
results show that if US LNG enters the European market at low or high prices the best 
response of Russia is to sell cheap gas on spot markets. This is in line with the spot gas 
15 
 
auctions held by Gazprom in 2015 September. There is however a middle level of US LNG 
price next to which it is not profitable for Gazprom to make strategic response. 
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